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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
UNITED STATES V. CHACON: UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, A FORCIBLE SEX OFFENSE 
CONSTITUTES A CRIME OF VIOLENCE EVEN IN THE 
ABSENCE OF THE USE, ATTEMPTED USE, OR 
THREATENED USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE. 
By: Chris Tully 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, as 
an issue of first impression, that a forcible sex offense, which occurred 
without consent and in the absence of the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force, constitutes a crime of violence. 
United States v. Chacon, 533 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2008). Specifically, 
the court opined that a forcible sex offense does not require physical 
force as an element and thus can be categorized as a crime of violence 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 252. 
On December 12, 2002, a Maryland state court convicted Jesus 
Chacon ("Chacon"), an illegal alien, of second-degree rape under the 
Maryland Code. The criminal information did not specify the conduct 
underlying the charge, and Chacon plead guilty to the offense. 
Therefore, it was unclear which of the three subsections of the statute 
applied in Chacon's conviction. Subsequently, he was deported to 
Honduras. In November 2006, Chacon illegally reentered the United 
States, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested 
him for using a false permanent resident card. 
On December 28, 2006, a federal grand jury for the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Chacon for 
offenses relating to his illegal reentry and use of a false resident card. 
Chacon plead guilty to both offenses. The Sentencing Committee 
calculated the Presentence Report for these federal crimes by 
classifying Chacon's previous rape conviction in Maryland as a "crime 
of violence" to increase the base offense level by sixteen. Based on 
this increase, the court sentenced Chacon to a forty-one month prison 
term. Chacon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. 
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Section 2Ll.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides 
that a prior "crime of violence" can increase the sentence for an illegal 
reentry by sixteen levels. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253 (citing USSG § 
2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)). Under this section, "crime of violence" includes 
ten different felonies and misdemeanors, including: forcible sex 
offenses, statutory rape, or any state law that has the element of the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Chacon, 533 
F.3d at 254 (citing USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1 (B)(iii)). Chacon argued 
that the district court erred because his second-degree rape conviction 
was improperly considered a "crime of violence" in the Presentence 
Report. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253. 
In Maryland, second-degree rape convictions arise from three 
separate scenarios. Id. at 255. The crime may occur when a person 
engages in vaginal intercourse with another: (1) by force or threat of 
force against the will and without the consent of the other person; or 
(2) who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically 
helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should 
reasonably know of the other person's condition; or (3) who is under 
fourteen years of age and the person performing the act is at least four 
years older. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253 (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27 § 
463). 
Since it was unclear which subsection of the rape statute Chacon 
violated, the Court of Appeals analyzed the Maryland second-degree 
rape statute in its entirety. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 253. The court found 
that the first subsection of the rape statute constituted a "crime of 
violence" under the guidelines because it contained the physical 
element language, "by force or threat of force," which is the wording 
used in Section 2L1.2's definition of a "crime of violence." Chacon, 
533 F.3d at 254 (citing USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1 (b)(iii)). The court 
also explained that the third subsection describes the rape of a minor, 
which is specifically listed in Section 2L1.2's definition of a "crime of 
violence." Chacon, 533 F.3d at 254 (citing USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 
1 (b)(iii)). Therefore, these two subsections are "crimes of violence" 
under the sentencing guidelines. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 254. 
The second subsection of the rape statute deals with "vaginal 
intercourse with a person who is mentally defective, mentally 
incapacitated, or physically helpless and, the person performing the act 
knows or should reasonably know of the other person's condition." Id. 
at 255 (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27 § 463). There is no language in 
this subsection providing that the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
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of force is a necessary element of the offense. Chacon, 533 F.3d at 
255. As an issue of first impression, the court sought to determine if 
this form of rape should be considered a "forcible sex offense" based 
on the definition listed in the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 255. 
The Fourth Circuit had to determine the ordinary meaning of 
"forcible" because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not provide a 
definition. Id. at 257. The court explained that "forcible" generally 
means "effected by force or threat of force against opposition." 
Chacon, 533 F.3d at 257 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th 
ed. 2004)). In addition, the court defined the term "force" as "power, 
violence or pressure directed against a person or thing." Chacon, 533 
F.3d at 257 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004)). 
The court continued by stating that "power" is "dominance, control or 
influence." Chacon, 533 F.3d at 257 (quoting BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004)). Applying these definitions, the court 
concluded that physical force is not necessary for an action to be 
"forcible;" therefore, the second subsection of Maryland's rape statute 
would be a "forcible act" without having an element of physical force. 
Chacon, 533 F.3d at 257. 
The court next scrutinized the intention of the Sentencing 
Commission.ld at 258. The Commission used the word "forcible" to 
modify "sex offenses," instead of the less ambiguous term "physical." 
Id. The court determined that the Commission deliberately chose the 
word "forcible" to show that "physical" was not a required element of 
"forcible sex offenses." Id. The fact that there are other sections of the 
guidelines where the Commission specifically chose to use the word 
"physical" supports this conclusion. Id. Additionally, the Commission 
included in its list of "crimes of violence" statutory rape and sexual 
abuse of a minor, which have no "physical" force components. Id. 
This shows that physical force is not necessary to make rape a "crime 
of violence." Chacon, 533 F.3d at 258. 
The court examined how other circuits have ruled on this issue. Id. 
at 256-57. The court acknowledged that both the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits have ruled that a "forcible sex offense" requires some 
physical component, and non consensual sex crimes should not be 
considered "forcible." Id. at 256. However, the court also cited to the 
Tenth and Third Circuits, which held that nonconsensual sex 
constitutes a "forcible sex offense," despite lacking any actual physical 
force. Id at 256-57. The court clarified that the latter approach is 
more appropriate as the Third Circuit ruling deals with the latest 
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version of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and is factually 
analogous to the instant case. Id. at 257. Thus, the court concluded 
that physical force is not a requirement for a "forcible act" under 
sentencing guidelines, and all subsections of Maryland's rape statute 
are within the definition of "crimes of violence." Id. at 257. 
The Chacon decision is valuable to Maryland practitioners. First, 
with other circuits split on this issue, the court's opinion may now 
provide greater clarity in this area. Second, the holding interprets 
Maryland's second-degree rape statute as a "crime of violence" for the 
purpose of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, allowing prior second-
degree rape convictions in Maryland to justify harsher sentences. 
Finally, crimes which are "forcible offenses" do not need to have 
"physical force" as an element under sentencing guidelines. 
Therefore, juries now have the ability to impose harsher sentences 
without having to find that a defendant committed an act of physical 
force. 
